Guns Across the Border

by John Ziller, Scene In S.A. Publisher

“Guns Across the Border” is not the title of an old John Wayne western. But with escalating drug wars and corruption threatening Mexico’s stability and spilling into the United States, complicating international relations, a good ol’ cowboy shoot-em-up scenario might serve the interests of both countries very well.

This is not about the flow of guns and ammunition into Mexico from the U.S. It’s not about arming anti-immigration groups to shoot illegal border-crossers. This is about stemming the rising tide of violence across northern Mexico promulgated primarily by Mexico’s drug cartels and related organized criminal enterprises.

The scale of violence against the Mexican people is extraordinary, particularly near our 2,000-mile shared border. The border economy, vital to great future economic growth of both countries, has been decimated.  Filling the vacuum are the Narcos and their organized crime activities—kidnappings, protection rackets, human smuggling and more.

As they have captured most border commerce, the Narcos are also capturing governments and police forces in these areas. And their influence on Mexico’s federal officials, though often downplayed, is also growing. The Mexican army is the only institution that has mostly resisted the Narcos’ tempting “job opportunities.” Worse, many Mexican schoolchildren today aspire to the Narcos’ opulent lifestyles.

A case could be made that the Narcos are taking over Mexico—becoming a second, underground government with their own bureaucracies, armies and police forces; reaping vast export earnings (drugs) and domestic “tax” revenue (protection rackets, etc.). And they seemingly operate with impunity.

One could conclude that the Narcos are not simply organized criminals, but an insurgency driven by economic ideology rather than political beliefs.  At best it could be called a criminal oligarchy.

Does this situation bode well for the future of the U.S. or Mexico?  Hardly.

So here are some quick fixes.  They are extreme reactions to an extreme situation.

First, a reactionary solution (from the right, with a sense of individual responsibility):  Mexico has no equivalent of our U.S. Second Amendment (right to bear arms). Insert a Second Amendment into Mexican law. Allow every Mexican that wants a gun to have one—long or short, concealed or open carry.  Right now the only groups in Mexico with guns are the army, the police and the Narcos.  Average citizens are defenseless. They can’t shoot back.  Those who carry arms, legally or illegally, win.

A second solution, a radical one (from the left, using big government):  Use the anti-insurgency tactics and technology we have deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan to take on the Narcos ourselves. For all of their firepower, the Narcos have been unable to win “set pieces” against the Mexican military.  Against U.S.-trained and equipped forces, the Narcos would be hard pressed to “hold a meeting” anywhere.  This “black op” would back up the Mexican military and police, some of whom still want to enforce the law and maintain order.

Traditional, old guard Mexicans would be totally against either “solution.” But average citizens might feel such measures gave them a fighting chance.

Internationally acclaimed columnist Thomas Friedman, one of the first to write about the new world economy, recently described Mexico as dominated by “Three N’s”: Narcos, No’s, and Naftas.

The Narcos we know about—though I don’t really think we can fully understand the breadth and scope of either their power or their influence.

Friedman’s “No’s” are those elements of Mexican society most Texans have met and understand best. Their wealth and power derives from 70 years of domination by a single political party, the PRI.  They are the key business and labor leaders who have gained influence and riches from state-owned and controlled monopolies.  These monopolies no longer function efficiently, but continue to support entire segments of Mexican society, from PEMEX oil union workers to farmers in state-supported ejidos. Most have no better future economic prospects; what they do on a daily basis hasn’t changed or improved for decades. But together they still control the legitimate Mexican economy. They will protect that control as long as they can.

Friedman calls a third segment of Mexican society the “Naftas.” This group has the potential to become a Mexican middle class that can play a role in consumption and production of goods and services in the international economy.  The North American Free Trade Agreement was intended to open Mexico’s market to foreign goods and open new markets to its products, especially if its labor force improved.  Many Mexicans have learned a great deal working in the maquiladoras of the border region and beyond. The Naftas have more up-to-date concepts of what they can achieve in a world economy, and believe they can do it in Mexico.  But both the Narcos and the No’s can limit Mexico’s future development, by lawful or unlawful rule. Neither group offers any real hope for the kind of social and economic development that could serve ordinary Mexicans and elevate Mexico’s involvement in the emerging global economy.

I am sure the “cowboy justice” outlined above is not only impossible, but could create more problems than it might resolve.  But having watched this drama play out over many years, I fear that waiting for the No’s to exert enough control over the country’s justice system to stop the Narcos—and then adapting their policies and procedures to compete in the world economy and provide more opportunities for a growing Nafta middle class—is wasting time that both countries can ill afford. Because the real question is not whether it can happen. It’s whether it can happen fast enough to save Mexico.

John Ziller is the publisher of Scene In S.A. magazine. He has observed, studied and done business with Mexico for the past 30 years.